Regional and Global Capital Flows: Macroeconomic Causes and Consequences, NBER-EASE Volume 10 by Giancarlo Corsetti et al.
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Regional and Global Capital Flows: Macroeconomics Causes
and Consequences, NBER-EASE Volume 10
Volume Author/Editor: Takatoshi Ito and Anne O. Krueger, editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-38676-7
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/ito_01-1
Publication Date: January 2001
Chapter Title: Fundamental Determinants of the Asian Crisis: The Role of
Financial Fragility and External Imbalances
Chapter Author: Giancarlo Corsetti, Paolo Pesenti, Nouriel Roubini
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10730
Chapter pages in book: (p. 11 - 46)Giancarlo Corsetti is professor of economics at the University of Rome III, visiting profes-
sor at Yale University, and research fellow of the CEPR. Paolo Pesenti is senior economist
at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and a faculty research fellow of the National Bu-
reau of Economic Research. Nouriel Roubini is professor of economics at the Stern School
of Business, New York University, and a research associate of the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research.
The authors wish to thank Takatoshi Ito, Anne Krueger, Carmen Reinhart, Aaron Tornell,
one anonymous referee, and participants at the tenth annual NBER–East Asia Seminar on
Economics for helpful comments and suggestions. Michele Cavallo and Scott Nicholson have
provided excellent research assistance. Giancarlo Corsetti acknowledges ﬁnancial support
from Ministero dell’Universitae della Ricerca Scientiﬁca e Tecnologica (MURST). The views
expressed here are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reﬂect those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, the Federal Reserve System, or any other institution with which
the authors are aﬃliated.
1. Among recent studies focusing on the large-scale speculative episodes in the 1990s be-
fore the Asian crisis, see Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993) and Buiter, Corsetti, and Pesenti
(1998a, b) on the European Monetary System crisis of 1992–93, and Sachs, Tornell, and
Velasco (1996) on the Mexican peso crisis of 1994. A number of recent contributions on
ﬁnancial and balance-of-payments crises provide a discussion of the issues introduced in
this paper—among others, see Dornbusch, Goldfajn, and Valdes (1995), Milesi Ferretti and





of the Asian Crisis
The Role of Financial Fragility
and External Imbalances
Giancarlo Corsetti, Paolo Pesenti, and Nouriel Roubini
1.1 Introduction
Episodes of speculative attacks on currencies in the 1990s (such as the
1992–93 crisis in the European Monetary System, the 1994 Mexican peso
collapse, and especially the Asian turmoil of 1997–98) have generated a
considerable—and ﬁnely balanced—debate on whether currency and ﬁ-
nancial instability should be attributed to arbitrary shifts in market expec-
tations and conﬁdence, rather than to weaknesses in the state of economic
fundamentals.1 Yet, advocates of both the “fundamentalist” and the “non-
fundamentalist” views agree in principle that a deteriorating macroeco-
112. A partial list of analyses of the Asian crisis includes Dornbusch (1998), Feldstein (1998),
Goldstein (1998), IMF (1998), and Radelet and Sachs (1998). A large number of contri-
butions on the crisis are available online on Nouriel Roubini’s Asian Crisis homepage at
www.stern.nyu.edu/~nroubini/asia/AsiaHomepage.html.
3. Note that the crisis of the Philippines, a country with better fundamentals and a less
fragile ﬁnancial system than other countries in the region, was also relatively contained. Even
nomic outlook increases the degree to which an economy is vulnerable to
ac r i s i s .
The problematic economic and ﬁnancial conditions in Southeast Asia
in the years preceding the crisis have been documented in a number of
recent studies (including our own contribution in Corsetti, Pesenti, and
Roubini 1999c).2 A widespread view holds that, regardless of whether the
plunges in asset prices after the eruption of the crisis were driven by self-
fulﬁlling expectations and panic, weak economic fundamentals were a cru-
cial element in the genesis of the crisis and in its spread across countries.
In support of this thesis, in this paper we present some preliminary formal
evidence on the links between indicators of currency instability in 1997
and a number of indicators of real and ﬁnancial fragility at the onset of the
crisis. The proposed tests do not aim at discriminating among alternative
explanations—rather, the goal here is to provide a set of baseline results
to complement and integrate previous analyses pointing to the fragile state
of the Southeast Asian economies before the eruption of the crisis.
One of the interesting pieces of evidence that corroborates a fundamen-
tal interpretation of the crisis is that well-performing Asian countries were
spared its most pervasive consequences. Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong
Kong were, relatively speaking, less aﬀected by the regional turmoil. The
Hong Kong currency parity was maintained despite strong speculative at-
tacks. Taiwan and Singapore decided to let their currency ﬂoat rather than
lose reserves by attempting to stabilize the exchange rate; however, the
depreciation rates of their currencies were modest, and, most importantly,
these countries did not experience drastic reversals in market sentiment,
ﬁnancial panic, and large-scale debt crises.
The three countries that were only mildly aﬀected by the turmoil shared
a number of characteristics: First, their trade and current account bal-
ances were in surplus in the 1990s and their respective foreign debts were
low (Taiwan was a net foreign creditor toward Bank for International
Settlements [BIS] banks); second, they had a relatively large stock of for-
eign exchange reserves compared to the crisis countries; third, their ﬁnan-
cial and banking systems did not suﬀer from the same structural weak-
nesses and fragility observed in the crisis countries; and ﬁnally, they were
perhaps less exposed to forms of so-called “crony capitalism”—that is,
from the system of intermingled interests among ﬁnancial institutions, po-
litical leaders, and the corporate elite characteristic of Korea, Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Thailand.3 China also falls in the category of countries that
12 Giancarlo Corsetti, Paolo Pesenti, and Nouriel Roubinithough the exchange rate plunged and the stock market dropped by over 30 percent in 1997,
this country did not experience the extent of the turmoil and ﬁnancial panic that hit Korea,
Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia.
4. On the role of moral hazard in generating such an overborrowing syndrome, see McKin-
non and Pill (1996), Krugman (1998), and Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999a).
were not subject to disruptive speculative pressure—the Chinese currency
did not depreciate in 1997; however, the presence of constraints on capital
mobility makes it diﬃcult to compare the performance of this country with
the others.
Conversely, as a group, the countries that came under attack in 1997
had the largest current account deﬁcits throughout the 1990s. While the
degree of real appreciation over the 1990s diﬀered widely across Asian
countries, with the important exception of Korea all the currencies that
crashed in 1997 had experienced a real appreciation.
The literature has pointed out several factors that contributed to the
deterioration of fundamentals in East Asia. The region experienced sig-
niﬁcant negative terms of trade shocks in 1996, with the fall in price of
semiconductors and other goods. For most countries hit by the crisis, the
long stagnation of the Japanese economy had led to a signiﬁcant slowdown
of export growth. Close to the onset of the crisis, the abortive Japanese
recovery of 1996 was overshadowed by a decline in activity in 1997. Last
but not least, the increasing weight of China in total exports from the
region enhanced competitive pressures over the period.
On the ﬁnancial side, a large body of evidence shows that the corporate,
banking, and ﬁnancial systems of the crisis countries were very fragile:
poorly supervised, poorly regulated, and already in shaky conditions be-
fore the onset of the crisis (see, e.g., International Monetary Fund [IMF]
1998; Ito 1998; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
[OECD] 1998; Pomerleano 1998). The evidence suggests a sustained lend-
ing boom in the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia—strikingly, these
were also the ﬁrst countries to be hit by currency speculation in 1997. It
also suggests a severe mismatch between foreign liabilities and foreign
assets of Asian banks and nonbank ﬁrms. Domestic banks borrowed heav-
ily from foreign banks but lent mostly to domestic investors.4
By the end of 1996, a share of short-term foreign liabilities above 50
percent was the norm in the region. At the same time, the ratio between
M2 and foreign reserves in most Asian countries was dangerously high: In
the event of a liquidity crisis—with BIS banks no longer willing to roll
over short-term loans—foreign reserves in Korea, Indonesia, and Thai-
land were insuﬃcient to cover short-term liabilities, let alone to service
interest payments and to repay the principal on long-term debt coming to
maturity in the period. One could certainly hold the view that the credi-
tors’ panic in Korea and Indonesia resulted purely from a standard “col-
lective action” problem faced by a large number of creditors in their deci-
Fundamental Determinants of the Asian Crisis 135. The countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Hong
Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, the
Philippines, Poland, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela.
6. See Buiter, Corsetti, and Pesenti(1998a), Calvo (1998), Calvo and Vegh (1999), Cavallari
and Corsetti (1996), and Flood and Marion (1998) for recent surveys.
sions whether to roll over existing credits or call in their loans (see, e.g.,
Chang and Velasco 1998, 2000). It should also be recognized that market
reactions took place under conditions of extreme political uncertainty, low
credibility of the existing governments, and skepticism about the direction
of (and the commitment to) structural reforms.
Although Asian countries were characterized by very high savings rates
throughout the 1990s, the deﬁciencies of their ﬁnancial sectors placed a
severe burden on the ﬁscal balances of the aﬀected countries. Such costs
represented an implicit ﬁscal liability not reﬂected by data on public deﬁ-
cits until the eruption of the crisis, but large enough to aﬀect the sustain-
ability of the precrisis current account imbalances. The size of this liability
contributed to expectations of drastic, but uncertain, policy changes (a
ﬁscal reform required to ﬁnance the costs of ﬁnancial bailouts) and cur-
rency devaluations (as a result of higher recourse to seigniorage revenues)
(see,e.g.,Corsetti,Pesenti,andRoubini1999bandBurnside,Eichenbaum,
and Rebelo 1998).
This paper reports and discusses a number of tests of the empirical rele-
vance of the set of macroeconomic factors recalled above. In our tests we
compare the performance of all the Asian countries subject to pressures
in 1997 with the performance of other emerging economies, for a total
sample of twenty-four countries whose selection has been determined by
data availability.5
The paper is organized as follows. In section 1.2, we present a summary
of the analytical model that is the basis of the empirical tests in the paper.
In section 1.3, we present the results of our empirical analysis. Next, in
section 1.4, we elaborate on the role played by the banking-sector weak-
nesses and the ﬁnancial distress of over-leveraged ﬁrms in explaining the
ﬁnancial crisis in Asia in the late 1990s. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 A Model of the Asian Crisis
After the outburst of the currency and ﬁnancial crises in Southeast Asia
in the summer of 1997, many observers noted that the traditional concep-
tual and interpretive schemes6 did not appear, prima facie, to ﬁt the data
well and fell short in a number of dimensions.
One reason is the role of ﬁscal imbalances. At the core of “ﬁrst-
generation” (or “exogenous-policy”) models of speculative attacks (a ´ la
Krugman 1979 and Flood and Garber 1984), the key factor explaining the
loss of reserves that led to a crisis is the acceleration in domestic credit
14 Giancarlo Corsetti, Paolo Pesenti, and Nouriel Roubini7. See, among others, Obstfeld (1986, 1994), Cole and Kehoe (1996), and Sachs, Tornell,
and Velasco (1996). If investors conjecture that a country’s government will eventually de-
value its currency, their speculative behavior raises the opportunity cost of defending the
ﬁxed parity (for instance, by forcing a rise in short-term interest rates), thus triggering a crisis
in a self-fulﬁlling way.
8. Among the contributions to the literature on the twin crises see, e.g., Velasco (1987),
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Goldfajn and Valdes (1997), and Chang and Velasco (1998,
2000). The role of moral hazard in the onset of the Asian crisis has been discussed by a
number of authors; see, e.g., Krugman (1998), Greenspan (1998), and Fischer (1998).
expansion related to the monetization of ﬁscal deﬁcits. In the case of
Southeast Asia, the precrisis budget balances of the countries suﬀering
from speculative attacks were either in surplus or limited deﬁcit.
In “second generation” (or “endogenous-policy”) models of currency
crisis, governments rationally choose—on the basis of their assessment of
costs and beneﬁts in terms of social welfare—whether to maintain a ﬁxed
rate regime. A crisis can be driven by a worsening of domestic economic
fundamentals, or can be the result of self-validating shifts in expectations
in the presence of multiple equilibria,7 provided that the fundamentals are
weak enough to push the economy in the region of parameters where self-
validating shifts in market expectations can occur as rational events. The
indicators of weak macroeconomic performance typically considered in
the literature focus on output growth, employment, and inﬂation. In the
Asian economies prior to the 1997 crisis, however, GDP growth rates were
very high and unemployment and inﬂation rates quite low.
In Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999b) we have suggested a formal
interpretive scheme that, while revisiting the classical models, brings for-
ward new elements of particular relevance for the analysis of the 1997–98
events. Speciﬁcally, we have analyzed ﬁnancial and currency crises as in-
terrelated phenomena, focusing on moral hazard as the common factor
underlying the twin crises.8
At the core of our model is the consideration that, counting on future
bailout interventions, weakly regulated private institutions have a strong
incentive to engage in excessively risky investment. A bailout intervention
can take diﬀerent forms, but ultimately has a ﬁscal nature and directly
aﬀects the distribution of income and wealth between ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries and taxpayers: An implicit system of ﬁnancial insurance is equivalent
to a stock of contingent public liabilities that are not reﬂected by debt and
deﬁcit ﬁgures until the crisis occurs.
These liabilities may be manageable in the presence of ﬁrm-speciﬁc or
even mild sector-speciﬁc shocks. They become a concern in the presence of
cumulative sizable macroeconomic shocks, which fully reveal the ﬁnancial
fragility associated with excessive investment and risktaking. While ﬁscal
deﬁcits before a crisis are low, the bailouts represent a serious burden on
the future ﬁscal balances. The currency side of a ﬁnancial crisis can there-
fore be understood as a consequence of the anticipated ﬁscal costs of ﬁ-
Fundamental Determinants of the Asian Crisis 15nancial restructuring that generate expectations of a partial monetization
of future ﬁscal deﬁcits.
It is important to stress that the ﬁnancial side of the crisis likely results
in a severe fall in economic activity induced by the required structural
adjustment. This is because implicit guarantees on investment projects
lead the private sector to undertake projects that are not proﬁtable. In the
tradables sector, the scale and type of technology adopted are not opti-
mal. In the nontraded sector, the proﬁtability of investment suﬀers from
changes in the real exchange rate accompanying the devaluation—changes
that do not necessarily depend on the presence of nominal rigidities. Even
in the absence of a self-fulﬁlling panic at the root of the crisis, the adjust-
ment to the existing fundamental imbalance may take more than a correc-
tion in the level of the real exchange rate. The economy must pay the cu-
mulative bill from distorted investment decisions in the past.
In addition, political uncertainty about the distribution of the costs from
the crisis, and about their eﬀect on the political stability of the leadership,
may dramatically increase the risk premium charged by international and
domestic investors—Indonesia being a striking example. A deterioration
of the ﬁnancial conditions may therefore deepen and prolong the recession
accompanying the crisis. These considerations are important in assessing
the relative merits of fundamentalist and nonfundamentalists views of the
Southeast Asian events. The ﬁrst view is not necessarily associated with a
quick recovery after a devaluation, since the correction of fundamental
imbalances due to moral hazard takes more than a relative price change.
In assessing the role of moral hazard in a ﬁnancial crisis we should note
that investment-distorting expectations of a future bailout need not be
based on an explicit promise or policy by the government. Bailouts can be
rationally anticipated by both domestic and foreign agents even when no
public insurance scheme is in place and the government explicitly disavows
future interventions and guarantees in favor of the corporate and banking
sectors. In his celebrated analysis of currency and ﬁnancial crises of the
early 1980s, Carlos Diaz-Alejandro (1985) stresses the time-consistency
problem inherent in moral hazard:
Whether or not deposits are explicitly insured, the public expects gov-
ernments to intervene to save most depositors from losses when ﬁnan-
cial intermediaries run into trouble. Warnings that intervention will not
be forthcoming appear to be simply not believable. (374)
This is because no ex ante announcement by policy makers can convince
the public that, ex post (that is, in the midst of a generalized ﬁnancial tur-
moil), the government will cross its arms and let the ﬁnancial system pro-
ceed toward its debacle. Agents will therefore expect a bailout regardless of
“laissez-faire commitments”—in the words of Diaz-Alejandro—“which a
misguided minister of ﬁnance or central bank president may occasionally
utter in a moment of dogmatic exaltation” (379).
16 Giancarlo Corsetti, Paolo Pesenti, and Nouriel Roubini9. Recent empirical studies of the causes of the Asian crisis include Berg and Pattillo
(1999) and Alba et al. (1999).
10. This section is based on Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999a). The weights assigned
to exchange rate and reserves changes in IND are, respectively, 0.75 and 0.25. For the pur-
pose of sensitivity analysis, we consider alternative crisis indexes with diﬀerent weights and
ﬁnd that the choice of the weight coeﬃcients is not crucial to our results. Also, alternative
tests with diﬀerent samples of shorter size provide similar results. All tests are available
upon request.
To summarize, in our model, private agents act under the presumption
that there exist public guarantees on corporate and ﬁnancial investment,
so that the return on domestic assets is perceived as implicitly insured
against adverse circumstances. To the extent that foreign creditors are will-
ing to lend against future bailout revenue, unproﬁtable projects and cash
shortfalls are reﬁnanced through external borrowing. Such a process trans-
lates into an unsustainable path of current account deﬁcits.
While public deﬁcits need not be high before a crisis, the eventual refusal
of foreign creditors to reﬁnance the country’s cumulative losses forces the
government to step in and guarantee the outstanding stock of external
liabilities. To satisfy solvency, the government must then undertake appro-
priate domestic ﬁscal reforms, possibly involving recourse to seigniorage
revenues through money creation. Speculation in the foreign exchange
market, driven by expectations of inﬂationary ﬁnancing, causes a collapse
of the currency and brings the event of a ﬁnancial crisis forward in time.
Financial and currency crises thus become indissolubly interwoven in
an emerging economy characterized by weak cyclical performances, low
foreign exchange reserves, and ﬁnancial deﬁciencies, eventually resulting
in high shares of nonperforming loans. Our empirical exercise below is
cast within this conceptual framework. Adopting the methodology sug-
gested in previous studies (e.g., Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz 1996;
Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco 1996; Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart 1998),
in the next sections we ﬁrst construct a crisis index as a measure of specu-
lative pressure on a country’s currency. Then, we compute a set of indexes
of ﬁnancial fragility, external imbalances, oﬃcial reserves adequacy, and
fundamental performance. Finally, we report the results of the regressions
of the crisis index on the above indexes.9
1.3 A Preliminary Empirical Assessment
1.3.1 The Crisis Index
Our crisis index (IND) is a weighted average of the percentage rate of
exchange rate depreciation relative to the U.S. dollar—if such depreciation
can be deemed as abnormal, as explained below—and the percentage rate
of change in foreign reserves between the end of December 1996 and the
end of December 1997.10 The logic underlying the index IND is quite
Fundamental Determinants of the Asian Crisis 1711. While, of course, an increase in domestic interest rates may also signal a frustrated
speculative attack, our crisis index excludes changes in interest rates. This is because an
increase in interest rates in the presence of speculative pressures is highly correlated with
nonsterilized foreign exchange intervention, leading to a fall in reserves.
12. In principle, IMF oﬃcial loans should be subtracted from oﬃcial reserves in comput-
ing the index IND. However, our results would not signiﬁcantly change if we accounted for
IMF disbursements in 1997.
13. Note that Turkey exhibited a satisfactory economic performance in 1997, with GDP
growing over 6 percent and its stock market being a leading performer among emerging coun-
tries.
14. Other authors use a diﬀerent approach to the same problem. For example, Sachs,
Tornell, and Velasco (1996) control for the variance of the exchange rate and reserves in the
last ten years.
15. Latin American countries included in the sample were hit by crises in 1994–95. We
refer the reader to the paper by Tornell in this volume for an analysis of the 1994–95 episode
and a comparison with our results.
16. The Czech Republic shared many symptoms with the Asian crisis countries: a ﬁxed
exchange rate regime maintained for too long, a severe real appreciation, a dramatic worsen-
simple. A speculative attack against a currency is signaled either by a
sharp depreciation of the exchange rate or by a contraction in foreign re-
serves which prevents a devaluation.11 We present the values for IND in
table 1.1: A large negative value for IND corresponds to a high devaluation
rate and/or a large fall in foreign reserves, i.e. a more severe currency
crisis.12
In evaluating the crisis index we need to control for the fact that, in
some countries, a high rate of depreciation in 1997 may reﬂect a past trend
rather than severe speculative pressures. For example, the fact that the
Turkish currency depreciated by over 50 percent in 1997 should not be
interpreted as a signal of crisis, as chronically high inﬂation rates in Turkey
over the 1990s have been associated with normally high depreciation
rates.13
There is no obvious way to purge the sample of the eﬀects of trend
depreciations not associated with a crisis. In this study, we take the follow-
ing approach: If a currency in 1997 has fallen in value by less than its
average depreciation rate in the 1994–1996 period, we consider this as
being part of a trend depreciation and set the 1997 depreciation rate equal
to zero in constructing the index.14 In our sample, such a screening pro-
cedure leads to a signiﬁcant resizing of the crisis index for two high-
depreciation countries: Turkey and Venezuela.
As table 1.1 shows, in 1997 the countries that appear to have been hit
by the most severe crises are, in order, Thailand, Malaysia, Korea, Indone-
sia, the Philippines, and the Czech Republic.15 Among Asian countries,
the currencies of Singapore and Taiwan were also moderately devalued in
1997, but these two countries were not subject to such extensive and
dramatic ﬁnancial turmoil as that aﬀecting other East Asian economies.
Conversely, outside the Asian region, the Czech Republic appears as a
crisis country16 because its currency, which had been pegged since 1992,























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.ing of the current account, and a weak banking system with large shares of nonperforming
loans.
17. Note that we limit our sample to devaluations in 1997, in the attempt to test whether
the devaluations during that year can be explained by fundamentals. During 1998, a number
of the crisis countries in Asia (namely Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia) experienced in some
degree a currency appreciation. However, such appreciations were the result of macroeco-
nomic adjustment policies and the implementation of structural reforms. Also, while some
currencies appreciated relative to their bottom values in early 1998, through 1999 they re-
mained weak relative to their precrisis levels. Note also that some countries in the sample
experienced currency and ﬁnancial crises in 1998 and 1999, outside our sample period. Spe-
ciﬁcally, Brazil was eventually forced to devalue its currency in January 1999 while Pakistan
experienced severe currency and banking distress in 1998. The case of Pakistan ﬁts our model
of the crisis very well: Already in 1997 this country had a very fragile banking system with
a large stock of nonperforming loans and a large current account deﬁcit. Brazil, instead, did
not experience a banking crisis but had an overvalued currency and a large current account
deﬁcit, two factors that enter signiﬁcantly in our empirical analysis. Also note that our
sample does not include two countries, Russia and Ecuador, that were hit by currency and
banking crises in 1998–99. Adding these two countries to an extended sample would have
strengthened the results of our empirical analysis.
18. In the appendix we describe in detail our methodology to estimate the series NPL. As
a caveat, NPL measures essentially banking sector nonperforming loans, and may therefore
fail to account appropriately for ﬁnancial distress in countries where the heart of the prob-
lems in the initial stage of the crisis was nonperforming loans among nonbank intermediaries
(such as Thailand and Korea).
19. These authors argue that such a measure is a proxy for ﬁnancial fragility as the quality
of bank loans is likely to deteriorate signiﬁcantly—and a large fraction is likely to become
nonperforming—when bank lending grows at a rapid pace in a relatively short period of
time.
20. The logic of the NPLB variable is straightforward: Nonperforming loans represent a
source of severe tension only when observed in tandem with excessive bank lending that
enhances the vulnerability of the country to a crisis.
suﬀered a severe speculative attack in the spring of 1997, leading to a de-
valuation.17
1.3.2 Indexes of Financial Fragility
Measures of banking system weakness are provided by the stock of non-
performing loans as a share of total assets in 1996 (NPL)18 a n da ni n d e x
of “lending boom” (LB), deﬁned as the growth of commercial bank loans
to the private sector (as percentage of GDP) in the period 1990–96. The
latter is an indirect measure of ﬁnancial fragility suggested by Sachs, Tor-
nell, and Velasco (1996).19 Both variables (NPL and LB) are reported in
table 1.1.
We adopt two indicators of domestic ﬁnancial fragility. The ﬁrst one
encompasses the information in both NPL (nonperforming loans) and LB
(lending boom) and is deﬁned as follows: If the sign of the lending boom
in the 1990s is positive, we assign to the new indicator NPLB the original
value of NPL; if the lending boom in the 1990s is negative, we set NPLB
equal to zero.20









20 Giancarlo Corsetti, Paolo Pesenti, and Nouriel Roubini21. In the tables, we present regression results for the 10 percent threshold, but similar
results are obtained for the zero threshold.
As regards the second indicator, note that according to the theoretical
model presented in Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999b) the vulnerabil-
ity of a country to currency and ﬁnancial crises increases with the implicit
ﬁscal costs of ﬁnancial bailouts. Under the maintained hypothesis that the
time series of NPL provides information about the size of the overall bail-
out in the event of a crisis, we can obtain a statistical proxy for the associ-
ated ﬁscal costs by taking the ratio of nonperforming loans to GDP in
1996. This series is denoted NPLY and is deﬁned as the product of NPL
and commercial bank loans to the private sector as a share of GDP in
1996. This variable allows us properly to assess the performance of those
countries with low ratios of bank loans to GDP but relatively large non-
performing loans as a share of banking assets (e.g. India and Pakistan).
In those countries, the contingent ﬁscal liabilities related to bailout costs
are smaller relative to countries with a similar NPL, but have a higher
ratio of bank lending to GDP.
1.3.3 Indexes of Current Account Imbalances
Table 1.1 reports the average current account balance as a share of GDP
in the 1994–1996 period (CA) and the real exchange rate appreciation in
the 1990s (RER). There is no simple way to assess when a current account
balance is sustainable (e.g., when it is driven by investment in sound proj-
ects) and when it is not (e.g., when it reﬂects a structural loss of competi-
tiveness), or to what extent a real appreciation is due to misalignment as
opposed to an appreciation of the fundamental equilibrium real exchange
rate. However, the consensus in the empirical literature on crisis episodes
is that the combination of a sizable current account deﬁcit and a signiﬁcant
real appreciation represents a worrisome signal of external imbalance.
Consistent with this view, we construct an index of current account im-
balance, CAI, deﬁned as follows: If the rate of real exchange rate apprecia-
tion is above a given threshold T, CAI is equal to the current account
balance (as a share of GDP); if the real appreciation is below the threshold
(or there is a real depreciation), CAI is set equal to zero.21
CAI








T (% ) 10
0
1.3.4 Indexes of Foreign Reserves Adequacy
and Fundamentals Performance
Other things being equal, the vulnerability of a country to a currency
crisis is higher when reserves are low relative to some measure of domestic
liquid assets or short-term foreign debt. To assess the role played by re-
Fundamental Determinants of the Asian Crisis 2122. In this case, the dummy variable would be equal to zero for countries with our index
of current account imbalance (CAI) in the highest quartile of the sample, or with a rate of
nonperforming loans as a share of GDP, i.e., NPLY, in the lowest quartile of the sample; it
would be equal to 1 otherwise.
serves availability, we construct three diﬀerent measures: the ratio of M1
to foreign exchange reserves (M1/reserves), the ratio of M2 to foreign re-
serves (M2/reserves), and the ratio of the foreign debt service burden (i.e.,
short-term foreign debt plus interest payments on foreign debt) to foreign
reserves (STD/reserves). The values of these variables are reported in
table 1.1.
To test for the joint role of fundamentals and foreign reserves in de-
termining a currency crisis, we classify the countries in our sample as being
strong or weak with regard to these two dimensions using dummy vari-
ables. Regarding foreign reserves, we use a broad classiﬁcation according
to which a country is strong if the ratio of M2 to reserves is in the lowest
quartile of the sample. The resulting dummy variable for low reserves,
D2LR, is deﬁned as
D if M2/reserves above lowest sample quartile
0 otherwise.
LR 2 1 = ⎧
⎨
⎩
Similar dummies are created by replacing M2/reserves with M1/reserves
and STD/reserves; such dummy variables are labelled D1LR and D3LR.
In regard to fundamentals, we focus on current account imbalances and
ﬁnancial fragility. Countries are classiﬁed as being strong or weak ac-
cording to the scheme
D
if either CAI in highest sample quartile









A similar dummy can be obtained by replacing NPLB with NPLY.22
1.3.5 Testing for the Role of Fundamentals Imbalances in the Crisis
Financial Fragility and External Imbalances
The results of the regression of IND on CAI and NPLB are shown in
column 1 of table 1.2. The coeﬃcients of the two regressors have the ex-
pected sign and are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level: Both a
large current account deﬁcit associated with a real appreciation and a
larger rate of nonperforming loans associated with a lending boom worsen
the crisis index. In columns 2–4 we interact the two regressors with the
dummies for low reserves. The coeﬃcients 2 and 3 measure the eﬀects
of CAI and NPLB on the crisis index in countries with high reserves
(DLR  0); conversely, the sums of the coeﬃcients 2  4 and 3  5

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.23. Their p-values are 0.005 and 0.09, respectively.
24. As a caveat, even when coeﬃcients have the right signs and are statistically signiﬁcant,
the relatively low R2 of the regressions seems to suggest that the residuals may be large for
speciﬁc countries; that is, a crisis was predicted but did not materialize, or was not predicted
but did occur, according to the sign of the residual.
25. Note also that the coeﬃcient on NPLB (3) is still signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in
this regression.
measure the impact of fundamental imbalances on the crisis index in coun-
tries with low reserves (DLR  1).
Looking at the regression results shown in columns 2–4, the coeﬃcients
2 and 3 are not signiﬁcant on their own but only when reserves are low.
In fact, for the case in which we use the reserve dummy D2LR, based on
M2 data, the Wald tests indicate that the hypotheses 2  4  0a n d3
 5  0 can be rejected at the 1 percent and 10 percent signiﬁcance
levels.23 Similar or stronger results are obtained when we use the other two
low-reserves dummies, D1LR and D3LR. As a whole, these results suggest
that structural imbalances (current account deﬁcits/currency appreciation
and nonperforming loans/lending boom) play a role in the onset of a crisis
to the extent that there is insuﬃcient availability of foreign reserves—that
is, in light of both fundamental and nonfundamental models of currency
crises, low reserves enhance the vulnerability of the economy to specula-
tive attacks.24
In table 1.3 we test whether the eﬀects of current account imbalances
CAI on the crisis index depend on weak fundamentals DWF and low re-
serves D2LR. Relative to column 2 of table 1.2, in column 1 of table 1.3 we
consider an additional regressor, namely an interaction term equal to CAI
times D2LR times DWF. In this case, the sum of the coeﬃcients 2  4 
6 captures the eﬀects of current account imbalances on the crisis index in
countries with low reserves and weak fundamentals. If 2  4  6 is
positive while 2  4 is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, the crisis
index worsens when a high-deﬁcit country with an appreciated currency
meets both weak-fundamentals and low-reserves criteria, but the crisis in-
dex does not respond to the reserves indicator if such a country is in the
strong-fundamentals region. The results of the Wald tests show that 2 
4  6 is indeed signiﬁcantly positive at the 1 percent signiﬁcance level,
while 2  4 is not signiﬁcantly diﬀe r e n tf r o mz e r o . 25
Column 2 of table 1.3 includes a similar test for the role of nonper-
forming loans. Here we add an additional regressor to those of column 2
in table 1.2, which is an interaction term equal to NPLB times D2LR times
DWF. Thus, the sum of the coeﬃcients 3  5  7 captures the eﬀects of
nonperforming loans on the crisis index in countries that meet both low-
reserves and weak-fundamentals criteria. Our tests show that 3  5 
7 is negative at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level while 3  5 is not sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The crisis index depends on nonperforming
loans in countries with weak fundamentals and weak reserves, but not in
24 Giancarlo Corsetti, Paolo Pesenti, and Nouriel Roubini26. In column 3 of table 1.3, we consider interactions of both CAI and NPLB with the
dummies for weak fundamentals and low reserves. The results for NPLB are similar to those
in column 2. For the current account, instead, we fail to reject the hypothesis that both 2 
4  6 and 2  4 are equal to zero. Formal tests such as the variance inﬂation test suggest
that this is due to multicollinearity between the two interaction terms: When they both ap-
pear in a regression, the eﬀects of CAI are swamped by those of NPLB.
countries with strong fundamentals and weak reserves. The implication of
these results is that a crisis need not be related to current account imbal-
ances or bad loans per se: Such imbalances represent a source of severe
tension only when they are observed in parallel with both fundamental
and reserve weaknesses.26
Fiscal Implications of Financial Fragility
Next, in tables 1.4 and 1.5 we perform regressions similar to those in
tables 1.2 and 1.3, but now we move our focus away from ﬁnancial fragility
and onto the role of the ﬁscal implications of ﬁnancial fragility. We there-
fore substitute NPLB—the nonperforming loans ratio adjusted to account
Table 1.3 Explaining the Crisis Index: The Role of Fundamentals and Reserves
Estimated
Coeﬃcient and Independent
Summary Statistic Variable (1) (2) (3)
1 constant 2.861 5.535 5.602
(2.138) (3.887) (4.082)
2 CAI 0.841 0.762 0.766
(2.946) (2.694) (2.771)
3 NPLB 1.338 2.569 2.583
(0.605) (1.954) (2.017)
4 CAI  D2LR 2.851 1.118 1.559
(6.650) (3.274) (6.293)
5 NPLB  D2LR 1.769 2.448 2.446
(2.091) (1.945) (2.000)
6 CAI  D2LR  DWF 0.834 0.497
(6.337) (6.004)
7 NPLB  D2LR  DWF 2.120 2.131
(1.123) (1.164)
Summary statistic
R2 0.516 0.596 0.572
R2 0.621 0.684 0.683
Addendum: Wald tests
Null hypothesis p-values p-values p-values
2  4  0 0.547 0.337 0.688
2  4  6  0 0.009 0.388
3  5  0 0.146 0.883 0.875
3  5  7  0 0.017 0.026
Notes: The dependent variable is the crisis index, IND. See appendix for deﬁnitions of variables. Stan-
dard errors are shown in parentheses.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.for the lending boom—with NPLY—a more direct proxy for the implicit
ﬁscal costs of banking sector bailouts.
The results are very similar and, if anything, even stronger than those
obtained in tables 1.2 and 1.3. First, as table 1.4 column 1 shows, both
NPLY and CAI are statistically signiﬁcant regressors of the crisis index
(at the 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively). Second, columns 2–4
of table 1.4 conﬁrm that the eﬀects of current account deﬁcits are more
relevant when reserves are low.27 The results of columns 2–3 in table 1.4
are worth emphasizing. Note that the coeﬃcient on NPLY, 3, maintains
the predicted sign and is statistically signiﬁcant on its own at the 5 percent
level. This suggests that nonperforming loans as a share of GDP—that is,
as a measure of the intrinsic ﬁscal burden—aﬀect the crisis index regard-
less of whether reserves are low or high.
In table 1.5 we present results of regressions equivalent to those in table
1.3, again using NPLY instead of NPLB. Once again, current account
deﬁcits and nonperforming loans matter if both reserves and fundamen-
tals are weak.28 However, observe that the coeﬃc i e n to nN P L Yt e n d st o
maintain the expected sign and be statistically signiﬁcant on its own, af-
fecting the crisis index regardless of whether reserves are low or high, as
well as regardless of whether fundamentals are weak.29
Real and Financial Weaknesses
Finally, we attempt to test whether direct measures of capital productiv-
ity have explanatory power as regressors of the crisis index. Conventional
wisdom holds that borrowing from abroad is less dangerous for external
sustainability if it ﬁnances new investment (leading to increased produc-
tive capacity and to higher future export receipts) rather than consump-
tion (which implies lower saving). For these reasons, a current account
deﬁcit that is accompanied by a fall in savings rates is regarded as more
problematic than a deﬁcit accompanied by rising investment rates.
Underlying such conventional conclusions, however, is the implicit as-
27. The p-values on the Wald tests for 2  4  0 are 0.001, 0.002, and 0.016 in columns
2, 3, and 4, respectively, under the three diﬀerent measures of low reserves.
28. These are the implications of the Wald tests on 2  4  6  0i nc o l u m n1a n d3
 5  7  0 in columns 2 and 3. The failure to reject 2  4  6  0i nc o l u m n3i s
again due to multicollinearity between CAI times D2LR times DWF, and NPLY times D2LR
times DWF.
29. To test for the robustness of our results we perform a number of other tests. First, we
use two other indicators of crisis that give more weight to reserve losses relative to exchange
rate depreciation; our qualitative results remain the same. As reported in tables 1.2–1.5, the
results are also robust to the use of three alternative deﬁnitions of low reserves. Next, we
test whether the signiﬁcance of CAI is sensitive to the threshold for the real exchange rate
appreciation; instead of a 10 percent trigger, we usea0t r i gger and obtain the same qualita-
tive results. The signiﬁcance of the two nonperforming loans measures, NPLB and NPLY, is
also invariant with respect to modiﬁcation of the deﬁnitions of these variables. All these
results are available upon request.
Fundamental Determinants of the Asian Crisis 2730. Also implicit is the assumption that high investment rates contribute to the enhance-
ment of productive capacity in the traded sector. If the investment boom is conﬁned to the
nontraded sector (commercial and residential construction, as well as inward-oriented ser-
vices), in terms of sustainability analysis the contribution of such investment projects to
future trade surpluses—thus to the ability of the country to repay its external debt obliga-
tions—is limited to their indirect impact on the productivity of the traded sector. The two
“implicit” assumptions above need not hold in the Asian case.
sumption that the return on investment is at least as high as the cost of
the borrowed funds.30 As evidence on the proﬁtability of the investment
projects, one can employ a standard measure of investment eﬃciency, the
ICOR (incremental capital output ratio), deﬁned as the ratio between the
investment rate and the output growth rate. In Corsetti, Pesenti, and Rou-
bini (1999c), we document that, for all the Asian countries except Indone-
sia and the Philippines, the ICOR had increased sharply in the 1993–96
period relative to the previous three years 1987–1992. This evidence sug-
gests that the eﬃciency of investments in Southeast Asia was already fall-
ing in the four years prior to the 1997 crisis.
Table 1.5 Explaining the Crisis Index: Bailout Costs, Fundamentals, and Reserves
Estimated
Coeﬃcient and Independent
Summary Statistic Variable (1) (2) (3)
1 constant 9.060 3.754 3.677
(4.233) (2.731) (3.026)
2 CAI 2.438 1.570 1.557
(2.439) (1.577) (1.633)
3 NPLY 6.912 4.985 4.957
(3.347) (2.164) (2.263)
4 CAI  D2LR 7.295 2.753 2.085
(14.900) (2.033) (9.972)
5 NPLY  D2LR 5.425 5.287 5.267
(3.246) (2.081) (2.160)
6 CAI  D2LR  DWF 9.905 0.685
(14.676) (10.005)
7 NPLY  D2LR  DWF 5.420 5.436
(1.060) (1.117)
Summary statistic
R2 0.566 0.818 0.808
R2 0.660 0.858 0.858
Addendum: Wald tests
Null hypothesis p-values p-values p-values
2  4  0 0.741 0.424 0.957
2  4  6  0 0.001 0.633
3  5  0 0.073 0.626 0.445
3  5  7  0 0.000 0.000
Notes: The dependent variable is the crisis index, IND1. See appendix for deﬁnitions of variables. Stan-
dard errors are shown in parentheses.
28 Giancarlo Corsetti, Paolo Pesenti, and Nouriel RoubiniIn Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999a) we derive a measure of the
ICOR for all the countries in our sample in the period 1993–1996. We then
test for its signiﬁcance in our basic regression model. We ﬁnd that the
ICOR variable is generally not signiﬁcant; however, a simple transforma-
tion of the ICOR is signiﬁcant in some regressions. We then deﬁne a new
variable, which is equal to the original ICOR when the lending boom vari-
able is positive, and is equal to zero when the lending boom is negative.31
When we regress the crisis index on the modiﬁed ICOR variable and
NPLY we ﬁnd that both variables have the expected sign and are statisti-
cally signiﬁcant (see Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini 1999a).
1.4 Financial Weaknesses and Emerging Market Crises
1.4.1 Banking and Currency Crises in the 1990s
Our interpretation of the Asian crisis focuses on the role played by
weaknesses in the ﬁnancial and banking system in triggering the currency
crisis in 1997–98. It is worth stressing that other episodes of currency crises
in the 1990s have been associated with banking crises. In the case of Mex-
ico, for instance, recent work shows that the ﬁnancial system was fragile
well before the peso crisis of 1994 (see Krueger and Tornell 1999). Weak
regulation and supervision, as well as an inadequate deposit safety net,
were all elements leading to moral hazard in the banking system and to a
surge in nonperforming loans well before the end of 1994. The weakness
of the ﬁnancial system was exacerbated by a poorly designed privatization
program in the early 1990s. This evidence casts doubts on the thesis that
the severe Mexican banking crisis emerging after the peso collapse was
simply the result of the double shock of devaluation and high real interest
rates in 1995 on the balance sheets of ﬁnancial and corporate ﬁrms. The
1994 crisis was perhaps the last straw for an already weakened banking
system, leading to a meltdown that is estimated to cost about 14–20 per-
cent of GDP.
Currency depreciation was also associated with banking problems in
the case of Europe in 1992–93. This is clearly visible in Scandinavian coun-
tries such as Sweden and Finland, where a severe banking crisis was
emerging since the early 1990s. It is also apparent in Italy, where a ﬁscal
retrenchment and the discontinuation of regional public investment proj-
ects made the banking system in the south vulnerable to the consequences
31. The idea here is that low capital proﬁtability is not problematic in itself if the corporate
and ﬁnancial sectors are able to assess properly the characteristics of the investment projects,
but may signiﬁcantly contribute to the buildup of tensions in the ﬁnancial markets if there
is a lending boom and excessive credit growth—perhaps driven by moral hazard and implicit
guarantees on investment by the public sector.
Fundamental Determinants of the Asian Crisis 29of changes in the relative price of nontraded goods due to the lira deprecia-
tion in 1992 and 1993 (the Italian traded-good sector being comparatively
smaller in the south relative to the north).
Some authors, such as Radelet and Sachs (1998) and Chang and Velasco
(1998, 2000), have interpreted recent emerging market-crisis episodes as
being caused by international runs—the international equivalent of Dia-
mond-Dybvig (1983) bank runs. Such runs are not caused by fundamen-
tals, but rather are triggered by self-fulﬁlling panics that turn liquidity
problems into solvency problems. In support of such interpretation, it is
commonly observed that the Asian countries did not suﬀer from the usual
symptoms of fundamental imbalances (high budget deﬁcits, domestic
credit expansion, high unemployment, etc.) preceding the currency crises.
In Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999a,b,c), we have argued that, along
with their many strong economic fundamentals, East Asian crisis countries
also featured severe structural distortions and institutional weaknesses.
The ﬁnancial and banking systems in Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, and
Malaysia were already in distress before the devaluation in 1997–98. The
same can be said for the episodes of currency crises in Ecuador, Pakistan,
and Russia following the ones in Asia. While it is likely that these crises
were exacerbated by speculative capital ﬂights, it is diﬃcult to argue that
such ﬂights hit otherwise healthy economies.
Prior to the crisis in Asia, speculative purchases of assets in ﬁxed supply
fed a strong and sustained growth in asset prices. Many observers believe
that equity and real estate prices rose well beyond the levels warranted by
fundamentals, inﬂating the value of collateral of households and ﬁrms.
Moral hazard arose from implicit or explicit government bailout guaran-
tees of ﬁnancial institutions. Banking regulation and supervision were no-
tably weak. In addition, poor corporate governance and what has now
come to be called crony capitalism—widespread corrupt credit practices,
as loans were often politically directed to favored ﬁrms and sectors—en-
hanced these distortions and contributed to a lending boom, leading to
overinvestment in projects and sectors that were excessively risky and/or
of low proﬁtability, such as real estate and other nontraded sectors. In the
traded good sectors, these elements led to accumulation of excessive ca-
pacity.
Domestic and international capital liberalization may have aggravated
the existing distortions by allowing banks and ﬁrms to borrow larger funds
at lower rates in international capital markets. In Thailand, for instance,
liberalization of capital account regulations (e.g., the establishment of the
Bangkok International Banking Facility) provided an incentive for Thai
banks and ﬁrms to borrow heavily in international ﬁnancial markets in
foreign currency and at very short maturities. Moreover, regulations lim-
iting entry into the banking system led to the growth of unregulated, non-
30 Giancarlo Corsetti, Paolo Pesenti, and Nouriel Roubinibank ﬁnance companies, fueling a boom in the real estate sector. Fifty-six
of these ﬁnance companies were distressed well before the Thai baht crisis
and were eventually closed down after the onset of the crisis.
In Korea, excessive investment was concentrated among the chaebols,
the large conglomerates dominating the economy. Counting on their con-
trol of ﬁnancial institutions, as well as on government policies of directed
lending to favored sectors, Korean chaebols undertook large investments in
low-proﬁtability sectors such as automobiles, steel, shipbuilding, and semi-
conductors. By early 1997, seven out of the thirty largest chaebols were
eﬀectively bankrupt and the Korean economy was mired in a deep reces-
sion. Corporate leverage was already high before the crisis. In 1996, the
average debt-to-equity ratio of the top thirty chaebols was over 300 per-
cent. It then increased dramatically with the devaluation, as this raised the
burden of foreign debt.
In Indonesia, a large share of bank credit consisted of directed credit,
channeled to politically favored ﬁrms and sectors. Although Indonesia had
already suﬀered a banking crisis in the early 1990s, these practices re-
mained prevalent. In this country, however, a signiﬁcant fraction of foreign
banks’ lending was directed to the corporate sector, rather than being in-
termediated through the domestic banking system. Most of the loans were
denominated in foreign currency.
An interpretation of the Asian crisis in terms of a pure international
bank run must confront the evidence about the shaky ﬁnancial conditions
in the crisis countries preceding the large outﬂows of capital of the second
half of 1997. A large body of literature (see Dziobek and Pazarbasioglu
1997; Honohan 1997; Goldstein and Turner 1996; Demirgu ¨c ¸-Kunt and
Detragiache 1997; Caprio 1998) supports the view that banking crises are
due not to random runs and panics by depositors, but to weaknesses
rooted in excessive lending, distorted incentives, connected and directed
lending, a weak macroeconomic environment, poorly designed deposit in-
surance, and poorly managed liberalization processes. Quite simply, think-
ing that systemic banking crises occur because of sudden and unjustiﬁed
depositors’ panic appears to be naı ¨ve.
Moreover, interpretations of banking crises based on multiple equilibria
models are somewhat incomplete, as nothing in those models explains
what makes investors shift expectations from a good to a bad equilibrium.
Some models rely on exogenous “sunspots” to nail down the probability
of a run—this is only a gimmick, with little economic or empirical content.
Drawing on the evidence on bank runs, weak banks are what tend to be
attacked, not solid and healthy banks. It is therefore plausible that the
probability of ending up in the bad equilibrium depends on the state of
fundamentals; if fundamentals are weak, the probability that agents attack
is higher. If one takes this analogy to a country level, the message is clear.
Fundamental Determinants of the Asian Crisis 31The countries that come under attack are countries that, in some dimen-
sion or the other, have weak fundamentals.32
1.4.2 The 1998 Recession in Asia: The Role of Financial Distress and
the Need for Systemic Corporate and Bank Restructuring
By the summer of 1998, the combination of sustained high interest rates
and illiquidity led to harsh economic contraction and a vast overhang of
bad debt throughout Asia. Many corporations were frozen in their produc-
tion decisions as they had little access to working capital and were severely
burdened by a massive stock of debt.
By early 1998, large parts of the banking systems in Korea, Thailand,
and Indonesia were eﬀectively bankrupt as the result of high interest rates,
a large and increasing amount of nonperforming loans, and the attempts
to rapidly recapitalize. The net worth of a large part of the banking system
in these countries was negative. Apart from a few domestic banks some-
how spared by the crisis, the only viable banks were foreign banks op-
erating in the region. It is also worth mentioning that the actual amount
of foreign ﬁnancing disbursed has been signiﬁcantly less than the headline
amounts announced.
Being under extreme stress, banks essentially stopped making new
loans. Because of the combined eﬀect of a liquidity squeeze and the risks
of corporate bankruptcies, banks went as far as denying loans for trade
credits and working capital. This was an important factor in causing many
corporations that would have been solvent under normal credit conditions
to go bankrupt. In support of this view, we stress the fact that, by mid-
1998, exports of the crisis countries had not signiﬁcantly increased in spite
of massive real depreciation. Firms had so little access to working capital
and trade credit that they could not import the intermediate inputs re-
quired for producing export goods.
Because of the severe liquidity crunch, for many corporations, liquidity
problems were turning into solvency problems. While some ﬁrms might
have been bankrupt before the crisis, the net worth of many other ﬁrms
became negative per eﬀect of the liquidity crunch; a combination of real
depreciation, high real interest rates, collapsing aggregate demand, and
liquidity squeeze was leading them to bankruptcy. For these reasons, the
net worth turned negative for a large part of the corporate sector. With
little alternative source of ﬁnancing (other than banks), the credit crunch
aﬄicting the crisis economies was giving way to a vicious cycle: retrench-
ment in credit—further economic downturn—higher nonperforming
loans and credit risk—more retrenchment in credit. Contractions in trade
32. See, for instance, recent work by Morris and Shin (1998) and Corsetti, Dasgupta,
Morris, and Shin (2000).
32 Giancarlo Corsetti, Paolo Pesenti, and Nouriel Roubinicredit were particularly painful, directly aﬀecting the ability of these econ-
omies to acquire foreign currency through exports.
The credit crunch for corporate ﬁrms was particularly devastating be-
cause, in East Asia, bank loans were the prevailing source of ﬁnancing for
ﬁrms. With banks and other ﬁnancial institutions in severe ﬁnancial dis-
tress, both short-term lending (for working capital purposes) and long-
term lending by banks and nonbank ﬁnancial institutions were drasti-
cally reduced.
While a banking crisis was also experienced in Mexico in 1995 following
the collapse of the peso, this crisis was diﬀerent from the Asian crisis in
one important respect. Relative to the case of East Asia, corporate bank-
ruptcies in Mexico were much less important in triggering the ﬁnancial
distress of the ﬁnancial sector. In Mexico, the lending boom preceding
the crisis was concentrated in the household sector. Households borrowed
heavily from banks (often in foreign currency) to ﬁnance their consump-
tion of durable goods and household services. Thus, the peso fell and the
ensuing economic recession caused ﬁnancial distress mainly among heav-
ily leveraged households. The inability of households to service their debt
was what led to the collapse of ﬁnancial institutions.
Over the summer of 1998, interest rates in Asia had signiﬁcantly fallen
relative to the peaks of the crisis, and in Korea they returned to precrisis
levels. In spite of this, a credit crunch was still severe in most countries:
While the price of credit had been falling, banks that were eﬀectively bank-
rupt or experiencing ﬁnancial distress were unwilling to lend to corpora-
tions suﬀering from debt overhang. As loans were still drastically rationed,
capital controls leading to lower interest rates would have done little to
ease the credit crunch. Moreover, it is far from clear whether they would
have helped to remove structural impediments to recovery.
While the need for a more decisive expansionary policy was widely rec-
ognized, several observers emphasized the need for an accelerated debt
restructuring process as the only eﬀective way to help the Asian countries
begin producing and exporting again. Such process consists of the follow-
ing steps: recapitalize banks, reduce corporate debt overhang, and provide
ﬁrms with debt moratoria and new priority ﬁnancing of working capital
and trade.
Suggestions for a comprehensive approach to bank and corporate re-
structuring, including a more active role of governments, were widely
debated. An accelerated restructuring of the banking system could be ac-
complished in a number of alternative ways. Banks that were undercapital-
ized but still solvent had to be recapitalized, either with capital injections
from domestic or foreign investors or through capital injections by the
government. In the case of institutions that were clearly insolvent or bor-
derline insolvent, the governments had to intervene directly, eventually de-
Fundamental Determinants of the Asian Crisis 33ciding among possible alternative actions: Recapitalize them in order to
sell them to (domestic or international) private investors, merge them with
stronger institutions, or close them down and sell their assets.
Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia tried diﬀerent approaches
to bank capitalization, each with a diﬀerent mix of private and public
participation, including recapitalization (mostly via foreign injections of
new equity), closure, and mergers with other ﬁnancial institutions. Accel-
erated disposal of bad loans, proper loan classiﬁcation, and provisioning
for bad loans were all elements of an accelerated bank-restructuring
strategy.
In these countries the approach to bank and corporate restructuring
was modeled on a variant of the “London approach” used by the United
Kingdom to achieve out-of-court restructuring. This approach is mostly
voluntary, case by case, and market based. Some suggested that the sys-
temic nature of the corporate and bank ﬁnancial distress in Southeast Asia
required a more aggressive approach with coercive elements and greater
government involvement. As a matter of fact, the restructuring process
has been relatively slow, especially in the corporate area. While the recapi-
talization of the banking system picked up speed in the second half of
1998, progress on corporate restructuring remained slow through 1999.
1.4.3 The Role of Foreign Ownership of Domestic Banks
in Preventing Emerging Market Crises
One key issue raised by recent crises in emerging markets is whether
signiﬁcant ownership of the domestic ﬁnancial system by foreign banks
could help prevent currency and ﬁnancial crises, or could help reduce the
impact of a crisis on the economy. In the case of East Asia, BIS-country
banks provided most international lending to Asian local banks, which in
turn lent to domestic corporations. Also in the case of Indonesia, where
international banks tended to lend directly to corporations, international
lending was mostly oﬀshore. It has been argued that direct ownership of
a fraction of the domestic ﬁnancial system by foreign banks may have
positive stabilizing eﬀects. The case of Argentina (together with some
other Latin American countries) is often mentioned in this respect.
In addition to enhancing competition and eﬃciency, and to bringing
new managerial skills and banking knowledge, international banks may
provide speciﬁc beneﬁts in periods of crisis. First, if a foreign bank lends
only to an emerging market bank, it does not have any stake in the corpo-
rate projects ﬁnanced by the local bank. In anticipation of a crisis it may
be rational for a foreign bank not to roll over its loans to the domestic
bank, even if, by forcing the domestic bank in turn to call in loans, such
decision causes ﬁnancial distress at corporate level. If, instead, a foreign
bank operates locally, it would be more concerned with the health of do-
mestic corporations. It would be less likely to call in loans abruptly and to
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the foreign bank directly.
Second, the presence of foreign banks could mitigate some of the prob-
lems that emerge with weak domestic supervision and regulation (an
emerging market regulator’s ability properly to supervise and regulate do-
mestic banks is often limited for a variety of reasons, and cannot be
trusted). International banks may be inclined to follow an arm’s-length
approach rather than relationship banking; and they may be less exposed
to political pressure to provide direct lending. Also, a strict regulation of
the foreign bank in its home country (say, the United States) may indirectly
aﬀect the activities of the bank’s branches in the emerging market econo-
mies. Third, foreign ownership of banks operating domestically may re-
duce the need for central banks in emerging markets to provide a safety
net, by performing as lenders of last resort. This is because the foreign-
owned local banks can rely on the foreign owners to provide funds in the
presence of sudden and rapid deposit withdrawals observed during epi-
sodes of panic.
On the basis of these arguments, some have claimed that a fraction of
emerging markets’ banking systems should indeed be controlled by foreign
banks as a way to ensure competition, eﬃciency, and stability. In favor of
such a view, the examples of Hong Kong and Singapore (where a large
fraction of the banking system is foreign owned) are often mentioned.
What are the main objections to such a view? One is, of course, a ques-
tion of sovereignty; but why should countries care about who owns their
banks more than they care about who owns their factories? The reason is
that banks have traditionally been used for political purposes through di-
rect lending, and as a source of revenue via ﬁnancial repression. This is
why governments are wary of letting go of domestic banks. Note that these
elements provide a positive explanation of why governments do not want
a foreign ownership of domestic banks; they do not provide, however, a
strong normative argument against foreign ownership.
A second objection casts doubts on the presumption that foreign-owned
banks would behave properly and avoid excessive risk taking. In the case
of Chile in the early 1980s, for instance, the Chilean subsidiaries of foreign
banks gambled on very risky projects and engaged in excessive credit cre-
ation. A third objection is against the presumption that a ﬁnancial system
owned by a small number of foreign banks would reduce the need for the
domestic central bank to intervene in the banking system, acting as lender
of last resort. It is far from obvious that these banks would not count on
the local central bank as provider of funds, when economic shocks or poor
lending decisions lead to ﬁnancial distress in the banking system. Large
foreign banks may have the power to impose ex post liquidity provision
and other forms of support, such as a government bailout of bad loans.
Overall, however, these objections do not appear to be strong enough
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emerging markets—especially in light of the track records of the countries
where foreign banks own a large fraction of the domestic banking system.
Yet, there are a number of issues that require additional analysis. Do for-
eign-owned banks in emerging markets need a domestic safety net (lender
of last resort and deposit insurance)? Will they expect it, require it, and
get it ex post if they experience ﬁnancial distress? Should the home country
rather than the host country provide regulation and lender-of-last-resort
support? These are complex questions with no easy answers.
1.5 Conclusions
The results of our empirical analysis provide evidence in support of the
thesis that crises are systematically related to the fundamental weaknesses
in the real and ﬁnancial sectors of the economy. The recent turmoil in
Asia does not seem to represent an exception in this respect. External
imbalances, as measured by the current account deﬁcits associated with
real exchange rate appreciation, are signiﬁcantly correlated with the crisis
index. So are measures of ﬁnancial fragility (nonperforming loans in the
presence of a lending boom) and measures of the ﬁscal costs associated
with ﬁnancial bailouts (nonperforming loans as a share of GDP). The
eﬀects of these variables on the crisis index are found to be stronger in
countries with low reserves.
The empirical analysis presented in this paper is preliminary, yet it com-
plements other analyses showing the extent of the deterioration of funda-
mentals in Asia in the years before the crisis. Per se, these results cannot
discriminate across alternative explanations of currency crises based on
self-fulﬁlling speculative attacks, as opposed to fundamental factors. They
do, however, identify a set of variables that appear to enhance the vulner-
ability of an economy to a crisis.
The indicator that seems to be most robust in our analysis is the indirect
measure of the implicit costs of bailouts in the presence of a ﬁnancial
crisis, i.e., nonperforming loans before the crisis as a share of GDP. In
related work (Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini 1999b) we have provided a
consistent theory of the role that contingent public debt plays in generating
twin ﬁnancial and currency crises. We interpret the empirical evidence
presented in this paper as an indication that this is the right direction to
pursue in a comprehensive research agenda on the Asian crisis.
The analysis in this paper highlights the role played by the ﬁnancial
distressofbanks, otherﬁnancialinstitutions,andcorporations intheAsian
crisis. The ﬁscal costs of cleaning up the balance sheets of banks is bound
to be very high, while the prospects for a rapid and sustained recovery of
economic growth in Asia depend on an accelerated process of bank and
corporate restructuring in the region. The recent recovery in economic
36 Giancarlo Corsetti, Paolo Pesenti, and Nouriel Roubiniactivity in the region may experience a relapse unless bank and corporate
restructuring is pursued more aggressively in the near future.
Appendix
In this appendix we describe in detail the construction of the variables
used in the empirical analysis.
Crisis Index (IND)
The index is a weighted average of the percentage rate of exchange rate
depreciation relative to the U.S. dollar and the percentage rate of change
in foreign reserves between the end of December 1996 and the end of
December 1997. A large negative value for IND corresponds to a high
devaluation rate or a fall in foreign reserves (or both), i.e., a more severe
currency crisis. All data are from the International Financial Statistics of
the International Monetary Fund (IFS-IMF).
Real Exchange Rate Appreciation (RER)
This variable measures the percentage rate of change of the real ex-
change rate between the end of 1996 and an average over the 1988–1990
period. The real exchange rate measure is based on wholesale price in-
dexes, using trade weights of OECD countries (excluding Mexico and Ko-
rea). For the three transition economies—Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland—whose real exchange rates exhibit large ﬂuctuations in the early
transition years, the appreciation is calculated between 1996 and 1992.
For Argentina, whose real exchange rate experienced large swings in the
hyperinﬂation period, the real exchange rate is computed between 1996
and the end of 1990.
Current Account Deﬁcits (CA) and the CAI Index
The current account deﬁcit as a share of GDP is an average over the
1994–96 period. Data are from IFS-IMF. The index of current account
imbalances CAI is computed as follows: For countries where the real ex-
change rate appreciated more than 10 percent over the period deﬁned
above, CAI takes the value of the average 1994–96 current account bal-
ance (as a share of GDP); for all other countries, CAI is set equal to zero.
Lending Boom (LB)
This variable is the rate of growth between 1990 and 1996 of the ratio
between the claims on the private sector of the deposit money banks (line
22d in IFS-IMF) and nominal GDP. All data are from IFS-IMF. In the
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or the ratio is very unstable in the early transition years, we take 1992
(rather than 1990) as the starting date.
Nonperforming Loans as a Share of Total Bank Assets (NPL)
As there are no homogeneous series for nonperforming loans, we need
to build our data set relying on several sources. For most of the Asian
countries in our sample (Korea, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia,
Thailand) there are two available estimates of NPL in 1996: one from the
1997 BIS Annual Report, the other from Jardine Fleming (http://www.
jﬂeming.com). Both estimates are biased; the former underestimates non-
performing loans before the onset of the crisis (for instance, the end-of-
1996 ﬁgure for Korea is 0.8 percent, whereas the latter is based on data
from the third quarter of 1997, when nonperforming loans are already
reﬂecting the consequences of the currency crises on the ﬁnancial condi-
tions of banks and corporate ﬁrms (for instance, Korean nonperforming
loans are estimated to be 16 percent). We take the average of the two
ﬁgures as a reasonable estimate of the nonperforming loans before the
onset of the crisis, i.e., the end of 1996 through early 1997. For the re-
maining countries, we proceed as follows: For India, Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela, we use the estimates for
1996 in the BIS 1997 Annual Report. For China, Singapore, and the Phil-
ippines, we use estimates from Jardine Fleming. For the other countries in
the sample, we rely on information derived from IMF country reports. It
is worth emphasizing that our estimates do not appear to be systematically
biased towards the countries that suﬀered a crisis in 1997. Note, in fact,
that noncrisis countries such as Mexico, China, India, and Pakistan all
show a very large fraction of nonperforming loans (over 10 percent of
total loans).
Fiscal Cost of the Bailout of the Banking
System as a Share of GDP (NPLY)
This variable is computed as follows. We take the estimate of the non-
performing loans as a share of bank assets (NPL) derived above and mul-
tiply it by the ratio of claims on the private sector by deposit money banks
at the end of 1996 to GDP. The latter variable is computed from IFS-
IMF data.
The NPLB Index
In deriving NPLB, we interact the lending boom variable with the non-
performing loans variable. For countries where the sign of the lending
boom variable is positive, we set NPLB equal to NPL; for countries with
a negative lending boom, we set NPLB equal to zero.
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We compute three ratios for reserve adequacy at the end of 1996. The
ﬁrst is the ratio of M1 to foreign exchange reserves (M1/reserves); the sec-
ond is the ratio of M2 to foreign reserves (M2/reserves); the third is the
ratio of the foreign debt service burden (i.e., short-term foreign debt plus
interest payments on foreign debt) to foreign reserves (STD/reserves). For-
eign exchange reserve data are from the IFS-IMF (line 11d). Data on
short-term debt and interest payments on foreign debt are from Data-
stream (http://www.datastream.com).
Taiwan
Taiwan is not included in the IMF database. Our data for Taiwan are
from Datastream and rely on Taiwan national data sources.
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Motivated by the severe Asian crisis of 1997, this paper makes a ﬁne con-
tribution to the growing literature that analyzes the symptoms of a coun-
try’s vulnerability to currency crises. While the sample of countries cov-
ered in the empirical analysis encompasses diverse regions, the discussion
in the paper focuses primarily on the Asian crisis. In particular, the au-
thors stress, as they have in their earlier papers, the key role played by
weak fundamentals in undermining several of the Asian currencies. Fi-
nancial sector fundamentals (as in Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999) play an
important role, but the authors also devote considerable attention to the
countries’ capacity to back their “implicit” contingent liabilities, partic-
ularly those of the local banking sector (as in Calvo and Mendoza 1996).
Furthermore, the analysis by Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (CPR) ex-
amines the links between crisis vulnerability and the productivity of in-
vestment projects—an important issue, particularly in several of the
high-investment Asian countries—that have been largely ignored in this
literature.1
By focusing on these fundamentals as well as on external imbalances,
CPR dismiss a relatively popular explanation of the Asian crisis stressing
a liquidity crisis/ﬁnancial panic story that arises out of self-fulﬁlling expec-
tations, runs on the banks, and the currency, and that downplays the role
of economic fundamentals. Since I happen to concur with most (although
not all) of the points made by the authors about the proximate causes
of the Asian crisis, I conﬁne my remarks to two areas: First, I focus on
issues regarding ways of strengthening the empirical analysis developed
in this paper; second, I dwell on some of the features of the antecedents
of the Asian crisis that merit attention and are not addressed by the au-
thors.
In the spirit of Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996), the empirical analysis
employs a cross-section of countries to examine which variables help ex-
plain the extent of depreciation and reserve losses (i.e., a severity index)
during the December 1996–97 period. The authors focus primarily on
three indicators: the interaction between credit growth and nonperforming
loans, to capture the fragility of the banking sector; the interaction be-
tween real exchange rate overvaluations and current account imbalances;
and the ratio of various monetary aggregates to central bank foreign ex-
change reserves, to assess the central bank’s capacity to back its contingent
liabilities. In addition, the authors include the incremental capital-to-
output ratio (ICOR) and its interaction with credit growth. The idea is that
Carmen M. Reinhart is professor at the School of Public Aﬀairs and Department of Eco-
nomics at the University of Maryland, College Park, and a research associate of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
1. CPR is not to be confused with the other CPR—Center for Policy Research.
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3. The discussion is limited to a couple of paragraphs.
during lending booms, funds are allocated to increasingly less-productive
projects. CPR also experiment with two types of dummy variables that al-
low for the interaction among the indicators described above. For instance,
the current account/real exchange rate variable is allowed to enter directly
as well as through an interaction dummy that takes on the value of 1 when
the money-to-reserves ratio is in the upper three quartiles.
Both the selection of the variables and the way they are allowed to in-
teract are intuitively appealing and well grounded in theory. I do have,
however, some practical reservations aboutthe information content of non-
performing loans for two reasons. First, banks often engage in the “ever-
greening” of problem loans for extended periods—as a consequence, non-
performing loans often lag rather than lead the crisis, and the authors use
1996 data for nonperforming loans. Secondly, the criteria applied to clas-
sify a loan as nonperforming are highly heterogeneous across countries,
particularly in emerging markets. My hunch is that most of the informa-
tion content of this composite term is coming from the lending boom
rather than from nonperforming loans.
As to the estimation strategy, my main criticism has to do with the inter-
action terms introduced through the two dummy variables. While sympa-
thetic to the economic rationale for wanting to include these additional
terms in the regression, I ﬁnd that they introduce serious collinearity prob-
lems. The presence of collinearity is evident in the large standard errors
reported for most coeﬃcients in tables 1.2–1.5. Most of these terms are
not individually statistically signiﬁcant; the failure to reject the null hy-
pothesis that the sum of several pairs of coeﬃcients (the Wald tests re-
ported at the bottom of tables 1.2–1.5) comes from the actual variable
rather than from the secondary interaction term. The absence of the incre-
mental explanatory power of these interaction dummies is also evident in
the reported adjusted R2, which, in the majority of cases, does not increase
by much and in some cases actually declines. The introduction of these
additional terms also chews up precious degrees of freedom, which in some
of the regressions is as low as seventeen.2
Apart from the collinearity problem, the results accord well with the
priors. External imbalances increase the severity of the currency crisis as
does booming credit. The interaction terms, although not statistically sig-
niﬁcant in almost all cases, also have the anticipated signs.
A second criticism of the paper, albeit one which is easy to remedy, is
that the authors downplay some very interesting results on the interaction
between the ICOR and lending booms and its role in explaining who is
vulnerable to this kind of crisis.3 As noted earlier, measures of the produc-
tivity of new investment projects have been largely overlooked in this liter-
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of the current account may matter—irrespective of whether it arises out
of a low saving rate or a high investment rate.4 In the aftermath of the
Mexican crisis, the “received wisdom” of the day was that Mexico’s large
current account deﬁcit was a problem because it was largely owing to a
consumption boom. At the time, there was little concern that Thailand’s
and Malaysia’s large deﬁcits would be problems since—the argument
went—the capital inﬂows were ﬁnancing record levels of investment. After
Asia’s crisis it becomes evident that unproductive investments are indistin-
guishable from consumption, as far as vulnerability is concerned.
Turning to the interpretation of the events and developments leading up
to the Asian crisis oﬀered in this paper, I agree with CPR that these crises
had their roots in a fragile ﬁnancial sector and that this vulnerability was
manifest well before the crisis erupted.5 As in so many banking crises, the
problems ﬁrst arose in the asset side of the bank balance sheet. Hence, in
the discussion that follows, I will focus mainly on ﬁlling some holes in this
paper’s telling of the proximate causes of the Asian crisis. CPR mention
that the liberalization of the capital account and the ﬁnancial sector was
an important factor in explaining the surge in banks’ oﬀshore borrowing
in the years before the crisis; I would like to mention two additional factors
that drove banks in these countries to become ever more dependent on
oﬀshore borrowing.
First, while ﬁscal policy mistakes are usually easy to spot, mistakes in
monetary and exchange rate policies are more diﬃcult to single out—
unless these produce high inﬂation. During the capital-inﬂow phase of the
cycle, the most common policy response in the region to the surge in capi-
tal inﬂows was sterilized intervention. Yet, as shown in Montiel and Rein-
hart (1999), sterilized intervention appears to be a powerful tool in inﬂu-
encing both the volume and the composition of capital inﬂows, although
hardly in the way that policy makers had originally intended it to. By pro-
viding a combination of an implicit exchange rate guarantee and high
domestic interest rates on short-term assets vis-a `-vis comparable interna-
tional interest rates, sterilization policies are a magnet in attracting short-
term ﬂows. These policies are capable of increasing the volume of the ﬂows
and skewing their composition away from FDI to short maturities compo-
nents.
Second, “push” factors were also important in explaining why banks
in the region became so dependent on short-term oﬀshore borrowing. In
particular, the protracted economic slump in Japan had dried up domestic
loan demand and Japanese banks were all too eager to lend increasing
amounts to the rapidly growing, capital-importing emerging Asian econo-
4. For a diﬀerent interpretation of why the current account matters in explaining the sever-
ity of crises, see Calvo and Reinhart (2000).
5. This pattern of interaction between banking and currency crises is not unique to the
Asian cases; see Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).
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mies. Indeed, Japan and emerging Asia in the 1990s appear in many ways
to have replayed the roles of U.S. banks and Latin America in the late
1970s and early 1980s.
To sum up, this is an interesting paper which helps us understand the
traumatic events of 1997 and 1998 in several Asian economies. Further-
more, the analysis is suﬃciently general to provide insights into the more
generalized features of ﬁnancial vulnerability.
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Comment Aaron Tornell
This very interesting paper belongs to a class of recent papers which show
that currency crises do not spread randomly. Although it is not possible to
predict the timing of crises, it is possible to explain an important propor-
tion of the cross-country variation in the intensity of the crisis in the event
that a generalized crisis hits emerging markets.
This paper focuses on the Asian 1997 crisis and shows that the lending
boom and real exchange rate appreciation go a long way in explaining the
cross-country variation in the crisis index. These results conﬁrm the ﬁnd-
ings of earlier papers and provide reinforcing evidence that the behavior
of private banks has important macroeconomic eﬀects.
A lending boom is an acceleration of credit from the banking system to
private and state-owned ﬁrms. During a lending boom, the fast growth of
credit might overwhelm both the monitoring capacity of banks and the
regulatory capacity of authorities. As a result, a greater share of loans may
Fundamental Determinants of the Asian Crisis 45end up in low-return projects or excessively risky activities. Therefore, over
the span of a few years, the share of bad loans in the banks’ portfolios will
increase dramatically. When this occurs, the country becomes an attractive
target for a currency attack.
Similarly, a severe real exchange rate appreciation reﬂects macroeco-
nomic imbalances, and might lead to a greater nominal depreciation in
case of an attack. Interestingly, this eﬀect is more pronounced in Latin
America than in Southeast Asia.
Unconditionally, a lending boom need not be a bad thing. It might re-
ﬂect ﬁnancial deepening, which is important for long-run economic
growth. However, as mentioned earlier, it might also reﬂect overinvestment
in low-return projects or excessively risky activities. It is thus important to
investigate whether a given lending boom reﬂects the former situation or
the latter. This paper takes a step in this direction by investigating the
eﬀects of higher investment on productivity growth. I look forward to fur-
ther results along these lines in future work by the authors of this paper.
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